“Orange Crush” -- R.E.M.
In the late 19th-Century, foreign colonies were requisite for any nation with imperial pretensions, and imperial ambitions were à la mode among the great powers. France was still smarting from the destruction of the Second French Empire at the hands of their Prussian tormentors in 1870. Still, Gallic pride across the colonies had to be maintained. Among those colonies was French Indochina, then comprised of the lands we now know as Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. French misrule of these region was replaced by Japanese misrule during World War II. but even before the final shots of that global conflict had been fired, French leaders were plotting to reestablish their domination over their now disjointed holdings.
In a rare instance of agreement, President Franklin Roosevelt and General Joseph Stilwell, one of the few American army leaders intimately knowledgeable of Southeast Asia’s people and culture, steadfastly opposed France reasserting its control over its Indochinese colonies. Roosevelt bitterly if accurately complained the native population had been better off before the French conquest. Instead, he thought to join the French holdings to China. But when Roosevelt presented this proposal to Chiang Kai-shek, the Generalissimo, experiencing an infrequent display of clarity, responded, “Under no circumstances!”
Sadly, Roosevelt was a dying man long before the war ended, and his death on 12 April 1945 robbed him of a voice in the fate of post-war French Indochina. His successor Harry Truman, being somewhat more dubious of the ability of brown-skinned people to chose their own destiny, actively encouraged and assisted the French return to Indochina. The United Kingdom, eager that eager to discourage any notions of independence within its own colonies, sought to set an example by supporting French colonial claims.
Offering an opposing opinion were Việt Minh, a collection of Communist and nationalist guerrillas led by Hồ Chí Minh, the French-educated founder of the recently established Indochinese Communist Party. After the fall of France and the Allied retreat from the South Pacific in the early years of World War II, the Việt Minh continued to carry the fight to their Japanese occupiers. Now that the war was won, they were expected to disband and await the return of the French. Until then, their former Japanese oppressors were allowed to retain their weapons and maintain order.
Offering an opposing opinion were Việt Minh, a collection of Communist and nationalist guerrillas led by Hồ Chí Minh, the French-educated founder of the recently established Indochinese Communist Party. After the fall of France and the Allied retreat from the South Pacific in the early years of World War II, the Việt Minh continued to carry the fight to their Japanese occupiers. Now that the war was won, they were expected to disband and await the return of the French. Until then, their former Japanese oppressors were allowed to retain their weapons and maintain order.
Need I add the Việt Minh were none too impressed with this arrangement? They had not fought a long and costly war so that a corrupt French colonial government could resume the exploitation of their nation. The Việt Minh had battled the French, then the Japanese. Afterwards, it and other nationalist native groups fought bitterly and bloodily over which would determine the nation’s future. The Việt Minh emerged victorious, and, only days after Japan formally announced the surrender of its already shattered Empire, Hồ Chí Minh announced the establishment of a Communist state, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. French and British forces allied with Japanese soldiers not yet returned to Japan suppressed the Việt Minh and restored colonial status. But in 1950, Hồ Chí Minh for the second time pronounced the Democratic Republic of Vietnam a reality. This time it took. In 1954, French strategists thought to entice Việt Minh forces into a decisive battle along the hilly Laos-Vietnamese border that would permanently determine France’s place in Indochina. France found the conclusive battle it sought but not the desired outcome. The French defeat was total. French dreams of Indochinese dominion died in the mud of Dien Bien Phu. France withdrew its troops and formally recognized the independence of Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam
Never one to learn from the missteps of another, the United States now chose to thrust its fist into the hornet’s nest from which France had just extracted itself.
Never one to learn from the missteps of another, the United States now chose to thrust its fist into the hornet’s nest from which France had just extracted itself.
The French left behind them a divided Vietnam. North of a line mainly determined by Bến Hải River, slightly south of the 17th Parallel North, Hồ Chí Minh’s Communist Việt Minh dominated. To the south was a patchwork of feuding groups, each fueled by its own agenda -- sometimes religion, sometimes traditional Vietnamese nationalism, sometimes anti-Communism, sometimes -- far too often -- corrupt ambition. A clever and capable if rather corrupt former bureaucrat by the name of Ngô Đình Diệm was soon to meet an unfortunate demise but for now governed what would soon come to be called South Vietnam. According to the terms of the 1954 Geneva Conference, the country would be unified by free elections no later than July 1956. Neither the United States nor Ngô Đình Diệm accepted the decision. President of the United States President Dwight D. Eisenhower explained their reasoning:
“I have never talked or corresponded with a person knowledgeable in Indochinese affairs who did not agree that had elections been held as of the time of the fighting, possibly eighty percent of the population would have voted for the Communist Ho Chi Minh as their leader rather than Chief of State Bảo Đại. Indeed, the lack of leadership and drive on the part of Bảo Đại was a factor in the feeling prevalent among Vietnamese that they had nothing to fight for."
“I have never talked or corresponded with a person knowledgeable in Indochinese affairs who did not agree that had elections been held as of the time of the fighting, possibly eighty percent of the population would have voted for the Communist Ho Chi Minh as their leader rather than Chief of State Bảo Đại. Indeed, the lack of leadership and drive on the part of Bảo Đại was a factor in the feeling prevalent among Vietnamese that they had nothing to fight for."
Nevertheless, elections did occur. On 23 October 1955, polls across the south showed returns of 98.2% for Ngô Đình Diệm. In Saigon itself, an astonishing 133% of the electorate cast ballots in his favor. Not to be outdone, inhabitants of the Communist controlled region north of the 17th Parallel voted in favor of Hồ Chí Minh by margins exceeding 99%.
Almost from the time of partition, a pro-Communist insurrection, initially low intensity but ever growing more intense, flared across portions of the south, resisted by a succession of governments with the support of the United States. But that is a story for another day. Today is set aside for discussion of Operation Ranch Hand.
When fighting the Việt Minh, French soldiers discovered that the verdant mangrove and rainforest foliage provided their adversaries with excellent opportunities to ambush troops and conveys. Using workers and conventional equipment, efforts were made to clear brush and forest near frequently used roads. When Americans replaced the French, they too realized the hazard presented by the ubiquitous lush and concealing vegetation. Long before US combat troops arrived in force, American leaders had reviewed the French solution and found it lacking -- too labor intensive, too slow, too inefficient. Herbicides had been successfully employed by the British battling their Communist opponents during the “Malayan Emergency.” America thought not only to duplicate their success, but to improve upon it. The project was given the operational title “Ranch Hand.”
Almost from the time of partition, a pro-Communist insurrection, initially low intensity but ever growing more intense, flared across portions of the south, resisted by a succession of governments with the support of the United States. But that is a story for another day. Today is set aside for discussion of Operation Ranch Hand.
When fighting the Việt Minh, French soldiers discovered that the verdant mangrove and rainforest foliage provided their adversaries with excellent opportunities to ambush troops and conveys. Using workers and conventional equipment, efforts were made to clear brush and forest near frequently used roads. When Americans replaced the French, they too realized the hazard presented by the ubiquitous lush and concealing vegetation. Long before US combat troops arrived in force, American leaders had reviewed the French solution and found it lacking -- too labor intensive, too slow, too inefficient. Herbicides had been successfully employed by the British battling their Communist opponents during the “Malayan Emergency.” America thought not only to duplicate their success, but to improve upon it. The project was given the operational title “Ranch Hand.”
In November 1961, the United States Air Force began the modification of six Fairchild C-123 Provider transport aircraft for the role that would make this particular model infamous. On 7 January 1962, three of these aircraft became the first C-123s deployed to South Vietnam. Three days later, 10 January 1962, the first official Ranch Hand mission, a test flight, was flown. As Operation Ranch Hand expanded and evolved over the months and years to come, many more test flights would be required, and the learning curve would be steep. The first United States Air Force fatalities suffered in Vietnam occurred on 2 February 1962 when a Ranch Hand C-123 on another test flight crashed, claiming the lives of three flight crew members.
Ranch Hand C-123 Sprays Defoliants
Along a South Vietnamese Highway
(May 1966)
Both the means and scope of missions would change as the United States role in the conflict escalated over the next decade. Operation Ranch Hand began as support for an ally combating a Communist insurrection. Initially, Operation Ranch Hand sought to deprive the Communist Viet Cong, as the North Vietnamese-backed National Liberation Front was popularly known, of the vegetation cover they so had so effectively exploited. Defoliation sorties targeted major transportation arteries such as rivers, roads, as canals, clearing a wide swath of land several hundred meters wide on either side. Thus, friendly forces could more easily evade ambush while Viet Cong forces moving across the area would be far more vulnerable to surveillance and airstrikes. But within months of inception, mission parameters expanded to include the spraying of herbicides over South Vietnamese agricultural lands thought to provide the Viet Cong with foodstuffs.
Two Vietnamese Girls in Mangrove Forest
Devastated by Ranch Hand Spraying
In 1965, missions expanded to the lush forests along the long spine of neighboring Laos in hopes of disrupting the vast network of trails used by North Vietnam to infiltrate fighters and supplies southward. Originally, dropped leaflets and loudspeakers were used to promulgate the reasoning behind the sorties to local populations, but these were eventually discontinued as the operation expanded. Usually but not always, herbicides were dispersed by aircraft mounted with 1,000-gallon capacity reservoirs. High pressure pumps would eject the defoliator from wing-mounted booms. On occasion, herbicides were spread by boat, truck, or even hand-carried canisters.
As the war evolved, so too did the mission. In 1963, the mission expanded to include transportation of equipment and personnel throughout the theatre of operations. On at least on occasion, the Ranch Hand mission included humanitarian relief. In August 1963, crops in nearby Thailand risked ruin because of massive locust infestation. In response to a request from the Thai government, a Ranch Hand C-123 sprayed the affected regions with pesticides, checking the threat. But always, defoliation remained the primary responsibility.
Operation Ranch Hand Borrowed
Both Logo and Motto From
the United States Forest Service,
Albeit With an Alarming Twist
The use of herbicides as a weapon of war was certain not new. As already noted, they had been employed by British forces in Malaysia only years prior to the first Ranch Hand flights. Even so, their use in South Vietnam proved controversial. Not unsurprisingly, Communist press organs railed against the defoliation missions. For less opportunistic and more ethical reasons, American scientists condemned the operation. Occasionally, a dissenting voice was heard in Congress or upon the opinions page of some newspaper. The Pentagon discounted ignored its critics so far as possible.
Ranch Hand Theatre of Operations
South Vietnam
But in October 1967, new questions arose about Ranch Hand efforts to destroy crops suspected of feeding Viet Cong fighters, and these could not be simply be ignored. Two Rand Corporation studies concluded that not only did the crop destruction do little to hamper Viet Cong operations, but they caused more harm than good by alienating the many innocent subsistence farmers living in the sprayed areas. "[T]he fact that the VC obtain most of their food from the neutral rural population dictates the destruction of civilian crops ... if they (the VC) are to be hampered by the crop destruction program, it will be necessary to destroy large portions of the rural economy – probably 50% or more." About 15% of Operation Ranch Hand defoliation sorties targeted croplands. Rand Corporation analysts thought the Air Force should find some means to spare friendly civilians if the operation were to prove a success.
Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara instructed the Joint Chiefs of Staff to consider the Rand Corporation findings and respond. The military would not be swayed. The Joint Chiefs agreed sprayings crops were not starving the Viet Cong into submission, but nevertheless surmised anti-crop sorties had merit. Devastating South Vietnamese croplands forced the insurgents to smuggle more food from the Communist north. The more transportations assets tasked to moving foodstuffs forced a reductions in the quantity of military equipment moved. Furthermore, the JCS response continued, the more Viet Cong fighters assigned to securing food resulted in fewer being free to fight. Finally, in a stunning example of infuriatingly military circular logic, the Joint Chiefs curiously dismissed the danger of alienating the rural population, arguing any South Vietnamese civilians dwelling in the affected regions were already predisposed to support the Viet Congs: Otherwise, they would not live within the areas being targeted.
Operation Ranch Hand Defoliation Sortie in Progress
Still, the tide of opinion began to turn against indiscriminate spraying of defoliants. Military support of Operation Ranch Hand remained strong, but by the time Richard Nixon won the Oval Office in 1968, the American civilian authorities in South Vietnam as well as the Saigon government itself argued convincing that the cost to public support of the war effort outweighed any possible military gain. Defoliation missions displaced huge numbers of rural civilians leading to a vast urban slum populations, placing additional pressure on the already hard-pressed South Vietnamese government. Further political complications arose during United Nations debates over whether the use of herbicides constituted a violation of Geneva Protocols barring chemical and biological agents as weapons of war. President Nixon desired to approve the revised Geneva framework, notwithstanding their conflicting with methods employed in Operation Ranch Hand. And since defoliation efforts in South Vietnam provided the United States Senate cause to reject ratification, the administration began to scale back missions. In late 1969, over the protests of the military, President Nixon reduced the scope of Operation Ranch Hand by about 30% and slashed the number of aircraft dedicated to defoliation missions from 25 to 14.
Even while military support for continued spraying remained strong, its death knell sounded in the form of a study appearing in Science on 15 May 1970. "Teratogenic Evaluation of 2,4,5-T" concluded that prolonged or concentrated exposure to Agent Orange, the most commonly deployed herbicide employed by Ranch Hand, caused birth defects and stillbirths. The Department of Defense ordered the cessation of Agent Orange dispersals. Further missions used up remaining stocks of other defoliation agents, but the spraying of Agent Orange never resumed. The number of missions sharply declined. 9 May 1970 witnessed Operation Ranch Hand’s final defoliate run. The final sortie targeting croplands occurred on 7 January 1971.
By the time the last mission dispersed the last defoliator on 7 January 1971, about 19-million gallons of herbicide -- including about 11 million gallons of Agent Orange -- had been sprayed across South Vietnam and, to a much lesser extent, parts of Laos.
Post war evaluation of the damage inflicted by Operation Ranch Hand continues and remains controversial, in part because of the United States government prolonged refusal to acknowledge the damage done to both the South Vietnamese population as well as many United States servicemen. During the conflict itself, the military assured service personal the chemicals they handled posed no health hazard. The Department of Defense clung to that fiction for so long as able.
Post war evaluation of the damage inflicted by Operation Ranch Hand continues and remains controversial, in part because of the United States government prolonged refusal to acknowledge the damage done to both the South Vietnamese population as well as many United States servicemen. During the conflict itself, the military assured service personal the chemicals they handled posed no health hazard. The Department of Defense clung to that fiction for so long as able.
Navy Veteran John Kirkwood
Unknowingly Exposed to Agent Orange at
Da Nang, South Vietnam
23-Year-Old Michael Szymczak of Highland, New Jersey
Suffers From Spina Bifida Thought to Have Been Caused
by His Father's Exposure to Agent Orange in Vietnam
Members of the Army Chemical Corps tasked with mixing and storing herbicides, servicemen assigned to load defoliation agents aboard aircraft, special forces and US Navy units operating hand-carried or mounted dispersal methods, and aircraft maintenance crews frequently suffered abnormally high levels of exposure. Even so, detecting damage resulting from herbicidal exposure is problematic. Vietnam veterans as a whole are more likely than is the general public to suffer from cancer, nerve damage, respiratory illnesses, skin disorders, or any of a huge host of ailments, all of which can be caused by exposure to Agent Orange or some other herbicide. It is often impossible to determine the exact cause a service-related disability. Still, educated guesses can be made. Significant exposure to Agent Orange doubled a veteran’s odds of develop invasive skin or aggressive prostate cancer.
11-Year-Old Nguyen Thi Ly and her 42-Year-Old Mother,
Both Victims of Dioxin-Related Birth Deformities (2012)
---
Both Mother and Daughter Live in Da Nang,
Formally a Major Staging Area for Operation Ranch Hand
The American government disregard of its own service members is benign by comparison with its indifference to the plight of Vietnamese victims. Much of the now unified nation’s most fertile lands are saturated with dioxin, the result of the widespread spraying of Agent Orange and other herbicides. Dioxin is highly toxic and carcinogenic. Infants and the unborn are especially susceptible. Birth deformities are a common side effect. By Vietnam Red Cross estimates, some three-million Vietnamese citizens are affected by dioxin-caused disabilities. This total includes no less than 150,000 birth defects. Since the fall of South Vietnam, nearly two-million refugees escaped the new Communist order to settle in the United States, Europe, or elsewhere. Those refugees fleeing regions subjected to Ranch Hand missions suffer high rates of cancer, stillbirths, and birth deformities. While the United States has undertaken cleanup efforts around former military bases used as Ranch Hand hubs, it steadfastly refuses any assistance to directly assist Vietnamese victims of herbicide contamination. Indeed, it continues to deny any link between the high level of birth defects within targeted regions and the herbicides dispersed therein.
Da Nang Center for Children Born
With Dioxin-Related Disabilities
Michael Stipe of the Athens, Georgia-based band R.E.M. When he was a boy, his father served as a helicopter pilot in Vietnam. Growing up on various US Army bases, the future singer/songwriter heard numerous stories about Vietnam including some about Agent Orange. In 1988, Stipe drew upon those stories to write “Orange Crush,” a musical statement on the war told from the viewpoint of a young American soldier.
“Orange Crush” -- R.E.M.
(Follow me, don't follow me)
I've got my spine, I've got my orange crush
(Collar me, don't collar me)
I've got my spine, I've got my orange crush
(We are agents of the free)
I've had my fun and now it's time to serve your conscience overseas
(Over me, not over me)
Coming in fast, over me (oh, oh)
(Follow me, don't follow me)
I've got my spine, I've got my orange crush
(Collar me, don't collar me)
I've got my spine, I've got my orange crush
(We are agents of the free)
I've had my fun and now it's time to serve your conscience overseas
(Over me, not over me)
Coming in fast, over me (oh, oh)
High on the booze
In a tent
Paved with blood
Nine inch howl
Brave the night
Chopper comin' in, you hope
We would circle and we'd circle and we'd circle to stop and consider and centered on the pavement stacked up all the trucks jacked up and our wheels in slush and orange crush in pocket and all this here county, hell, any county, it's just like heaven here, and I was remembering and I was just in a different county and all then this whirlybird that I headed for I had my goggles pulled off; I knew it all, I knew every back road and every truck stop
(Follow me, don't follow me)
I've got my spine, I've got my orange crush
(Collar me, don't collar me)
I've got my spine, I've got my orange crush
(We are agents of the free)
I've had my fun and now it's time to serve your conscience overseas
(Over me, not over me)
Coming in fast, over me (oh, oh)
High on the booze
In a tent
Paved with blood
Nine inch howl
Brave the night
Chopper comin' in, you hope
High on the booze
In a tent
Paved with blood
Nine inch howl
Brave the night
Chopper comin' in, you hope
(Ah, oh)
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