The Year 1812, Festival Overture in E♭ Major, Op. 49 -- Pyotr Ilyich Tchaikovsky, Composer
By 1792, the revolutionary French slogan of liberté, égalité, fraternité was the talk of Europe's oppressed masses. Talk of egalitarianism, democracy, political freedom, emancipation of the Jews, legal reform, meritocracy, property rights, religious toleration, and equality under the law could be heard in beer halls and around dinner tables in all of Europe, threatening the existing social order. The time had come, France's more conservative neighbors decided, to stamp out these political heresies before they could take firm root. An alliance -- remembered by history as the First Coalition to distinguish it from the six successive coalitions of nations eventually required to decisively defeat France -- united with the goal of crushing French republicanism and returning France to monarchical rule.
The French Republic found a savior against the overwhelming force assembled against her in the 26-year-old scion of a Corsican family with Italian roots and belonging to the minor minor nobility. Born the year following Corsica’s becoming a part of France, the young Napoleone di Buonaparte thrived in the more egalitarian atmosphere of the First French Republic. Even so, always conscious his Genoese heritage, he would change his name to and achieve lasting fame as the more Gallic sounding Napoléon Bonaparte.
For over a decade, Napoléon displayed the audacity and talent that would make him the premiere military tactician of the 18th and19th centuries by leading French forces to victory after victory over various conservative coalitions determined to stamp out the liberal ideas of the French Revolution. In the end, it might fairly be said that Napoléon was undone not so much by the skills of his opponents as he was by his own hubris and overreach.
To be sure, despite his skilled and invaluable service to the French First Republic, Napoléon was no friend of republicanism. France served as midwife to four notable republics during Napoléon’s lifespan, all of which were inspired by the idealism of the European Enlightenment: the United States, The First French Republic, the Ligurian Republic, and the Republic of Haiti. Napoléon personally oversaw the demise of three of these republics. The first of these four republics, the nascent United States, he viewed only as an implement to hinder Great Britain, the most capable of his many enemies.
Having defeated the most talented generals the opposing nations of Europe could muster against him, Napoléon became the instrument of his own downfall. In 1792, the First Republic had abolished slavery in all French colonies and holdings, a decision Napoléon though to reverse in 1802. Napoléon dispatched armies to Haiti to enforce his will, but to his dismay, the liberated slaves proved more capable of defending their newfound freedom than he had expected. Former slaves, with the assistance of yellow fever, killed over 50,000 French troops -- including 18 generals -- before Napoléon accepted the reality of Haitian independence. Despite the defeat, Napoléon derived some measure of schadenfreude in his role of ensuring the lasting ruin of Haiti.
Shamefully, the United States played a most unsavory part in this bloody tragedy. Fearful that a successful free black republic might serve to inspire its own mostly slave black population, the American government conspired to encourage violence and insurrection among former slaves so as to insure no stable and peaceful government would survive the French defeat. The United States would profit immensely from the French defeat in Haiti: His transAtlantic ambitions shattered, Napoléon would sell the vast Louisiana territory to the United States for a mere 15-million dollars.
His 1807 invasion of Portugal and intervention in Spain resulted in a vicious and sagine stalemate that tied down 300,000 or so French troops desperately needed elsewhere. Furthermore, the Peninsular War, as this conflict came to be called, enabled Arthur Wellesley, later the First Duke of Wellington, to win the attention that propelled into to the rank of field marshall. He would prove perhaps the most capable of the many opponents to face off against Napoléon.
Still, Napoléon’s most costly error would be his 1812 invasion of Russia. The steppes of Russia seem to call seductively to European tyrants unable to resist their Siren-like appeal. An ill-advised invasion of Russia had cost Charles XII of Sweden his empire in the 18th-century. In the 20th-century, Hitler’s obsession with Russia would destroy the “Tausendjährige Reich” (“Thousand-Year Reich”) only 11 years after its being proclaimed. But in the 19th-Century, its was Napoléon turn to make this suicidal error. On 24 June 1812, he led his troops across the Russian border.
The Grande Armée which Napoléon led into Russia was comprised of troops from the entirety of continental Europe. Fewer than half the soldiers were actually French. Why did they follow Napoléon onto the seemingly endless steppes? Some convinced of success by Napoléon repeatedly defeating every army to face him on the field of battle. Others were inspired by the liberal reformed spread across Europe in the wake of the French Revolution. Many, no doubt, were simply pursuing mercenary gains. But whatever their reasons and goals, they were only to find death and disappointment in Russia. About 680,000 troops marched into Russia under Napoléon’s banners. Nearly 400,000 would die there. Another 100,000 would remain as prisoners of the Czar.
Napoléon excelled at set piece battles. Knowing this, Russian commanders refused to give him one. They merely retreating, leaving nothing behind on which the Grande Armée could subsist. The French were astonished by the cruel scorched-earth Russian tactics, leaving nothing on which the Grande Armée could feed, they condemned their civilization to starvation.
Finally, on this day in 1812, at Borodino, a rural village about 70 miles west of Moscow, Russian forces under the command of Prince Mikhail Kutuzov gave Napoléon the battle he sought. The battle of Borodino was a pyrrhic victory for French forces. The Grande Armée won the field, forcing the severely mauled Russian troops to retreat, but Napoléon, suffering an uncharacteristic failure of nerves, refused to release his reserves to attack the surviving Russian defenders. Napoléon missed his one opportunity to destroy his opponent’s army: The Russians refused to give him another. Russian, having learned their lesson, returned to their previous tactics of falling back into the endless Russian interior, leaving nothing in their wake to feed or shelter their foes.
Napoléon and his starving, freezing troops had no option but to begin the long, costly retreat westward. On 14 December 1812, the tattered survivors of the Grande Armée were finally free of Russia, but France’s military forces never recovered to its former might. Napoléon had gambled once too often.
On 20 August 1882, Tchaikovsky’s most famous composition, popularly known as the “1812 Overture” debuted in Moscow, celebrating Russia’s victory over Napoléon.
For over a decade, Napoléon displayed the audacity and talent that would make him the premiere military tactician of the 18th and19th centuries by leading French forces to victory after victory over various conservative coalitions determined to stamp out the liberal ideas of the French Revolution. In the end, it might fairly be said that Napoléon was undone not so much by the skills of his opponents as he was by his own hubris and overreach.
To be sure, despite his skilled and invaluable service to the French First Republic, Napoléon was no friend of republicanism. France served as midwife to four notable republics during Napoléon’s lifespan, all of which were inspired by the idealism of the European Enlightenment: the United States, The First French Republic, the Ligurian Republic, and the Republic of Haiti. Napoléon personally oversaw the demise of three of these republics. The first of these four republics, the nascent United States, he viewed only as an implement to hinder Great Britain, the most capable of his many enemies.
Having defeated the most talented generals the opposing nations of Europe could muster against him, Napoléon became the instrument of his own downfall. In 1792, the First Republic had abolished slavery in all French colonies and holdings, a decision Napoléon though to reverse in 1802. Napoléon dispatched armies to Haiti to enforce his will, but to his dismay, the liberated slaves proved more capable of defending their newfound freedom than he had expected. Former slaves, with the assistance of yellow fever, killed over 50,000 French troops -- including 18 generals -- before Napoléon accepted the reality of Haitian independence. Despite the defeat, Napoléon derived some measure of schadenfreude in his role of ensuring the lasting ruin of Haiti.
Shamefully, the United States played a most unsavory part in this bloody tragedy. Fearful that a successful free black republic might serve to inspire its own mostly slave black population, the American government conspired to encourage violence and insurrection among former slaves so as to insure no stable and peaceful government would survive the French defeat. The United States would profit immensely from the French defeat in Haiti: His transAtlantic ambitions shattered, Napoléon would sell the vast Louisiana territory to the United States for a mere 15-million dollars.
His 1807 invasion of Portugal and intervention in Spain resulted in a vicious and sagine stalemate that tied down 300,000 or so French troops desperately needed elsewhere. Furthermore, the Peninsular War, as this conflict came to be called, enabled Arthur Wellesley, later the First Duke of Wellington, to win the attention that propelled into to the rank of field marshall. He would prove perhaps the most capable of the many opponents to face off against Napoléon.
Still, Napoléon’s most costly error would be his 1812 invasion of Russia. The steppes of Russia seem to call seductively to European tyrants unable to resist their Siren-like appeal. An ill-advised invasion of Russia had cost Charles XII of Sweden his empire in the 18th-century. In the 20th-century, Hitler’s obsession with Russia would destroy the “Tausendjährige Reich” (“Thousand-Year Reich”) only 11 years after its being proclaimed. But in the 19th-Century, its was Napoléon turn to make this suicidal error. On 24 June 1812, he led his troops across the Russian border.
The Grande Armée which Napoléon led into Russia was comprised of troops from the entirety of continental Europe. Fewer than half the soldiers were actually French. Why did they follow Napoléon onto the seemingly endless steppes? Some convinced of success by Napoléon repeatedly defeating every army to face him on the field of battle. Others were inspired by the liberal reformed spread across Europe in the wake of the French Revolution. Many, no doubt, were simply pursuing mercenary gains. But whatever their reasons and goals, they were only to find death and disappointment in Russia. About 680,000 troops marched into Russia under Napoléon’s banners. Nearly 400,000 would die there. Another 100,000 would remain as prisoners of the Czar.
Napoléon excelled at set piece battles. Knowing this, Russian commanders refused to give him one. They merely retreating, leaving nothing behind on which the Grande Armée could subsist. The French were astonished by the cruel scorched-earth Russian tactics, leaving nothing on which the Grande Armée could feed, they condemned their civilization to starvation.
Finally, on this day in 1812, at Borodino, a rural village about 70 miles west of Moscow, Russian forces under the command of Prince Mikhail Kutuzov gave Napoléon the battle he sought. The battle of Borodino was a pyrrhic victory for French forces. The Grande Armée won the field, forcing the severely mauled Russian troops to retreat, but Napoléon, suffering an uncharacteristic failure of nerves, refused to release his reserves to attack the surviving Russian defenders. Napoléon missed his one opportunity to destroy his opponent’s army: The Russians refused to give him another. Russian, having learned their lesson, returned to their previous tactics of falling back into the endless Russian interior, leaving nothing in their wake to feed or shelter their foes.
Napoléon and his starving, freezing troops had no option but to begin the long, costly retreat westward. On 14 December 1812, the tattered survivors of the Grande Armée were finally free of Russia, but France’s military forces never recovered to its former might. Napoléon had gambled once too often.
On 20 August 1882, Tchaikovsky’s most famous composition, popularly known as the “1812 Overture” debuted in Moscow, celebrating Russia’s victory over Napoléon.
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